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Introduction
It has long been argued that identity matters in international relations. Yet, how identity impacts enmity and conflict among states remains an issue of debate. The existing literature asserts that differences in identity and culture can be a source of conflict, whereas convergence and similarity can lead to cooperation (Huntington 1993 (Huntington , 1996 Horowitz 1995) . Likewise, constructivists in international relations (IR) argue that states will identify positively with those with a similar identity (Wendt 1999) . As Haas has argued, 'the greater the ideological similarities among states' leaders, the more likely they will view one another's interests as complementary, and thus the greater the incentives pushing these individuals to form an alliance ' (2003:36) . Nevertheless, empirical evidence from the Middle East has long defied this hypothesis. As Walt observed in his study of alliances in the region, 'certain ideologies are more a source of division than of unity, even though the ideology explicitly prescribes close cooperation among the adherents ' (1987:170) . Pan-Islamism, which overtly aims to overcome national territorial differences and unify different entities in the region, has paradoxically been a source of fragmentation and division. 2 This article extends upon, and goes beyond, the existing literature to argue that similarities in identity can be a source of conflict and enmity. Largely based on the adaptation of 'ontological security' to IR theory (McSweeney 1999; Steele 2005 Steele , 2008 Mitzen 2006) , this article proposes a theoretical framework to explain how similarity can generate anxiety and identity risks. Building on the assumption that states have a basic need for ontological security, which refers to 'the need to experience oneself as a whole' (Mitzen 2006:342) , I argue that security is enforced through a stable conception of self-identity. The essence of such a conception of self-identity is the distinctiveness of the self vis-à-vis the other. Accordingly, critical situations leading to the erosion of such distinctiveness trigger anxiety and insecurity, as the regimes' identities become equivocal. As a reactionary imperative, actors attempt to restore a secure self-identity through two mechanisms: counter-framing the other in a demonizing manner and reinventing a new self-other distinction. This argument is illustrated through a close comparative examination of Saudi foreign policy in 1979 and 2012.
Despite its pan-Islamic nature, the Islamic revolution in Iran was perceived as a threat to the Saudi Kingdom, a monarchy which itself asserted a broad pan-Islamic identity. This antiIranian stance was often couched in sectarian terms, with the kingdom defining its identity as 'Sunni' vis-à-vis a 'Shiite' other. Following the 2011 Arab uprisings, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political offshoot the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt brought up several uncertainties within the Saudi royal elite, who could not hide their relief at the Brotherhood's quick downfall a year later. The Saudi reactions to the ascendance of this Sunni movement to power in Egypt went beyond the conventional sectarian polarization in the region to reveal a fundamental truth: the rise of any Islamic regime with a pan-Islamic vocation is a source of anxiety to the kingdom. This article addresses the resulting puzzle: why does Saudi Arabia, a monarchy that prides itself on its pan-Islamic identity and for ruling according to shari'a, oppose the rise of Islamist movements to power in the Middle East? Why and how can ideologically similar regimes be considered sources of identity risks?
2 Other examples of identity similarity leading to divisions include the competition among pan-Arab nationalist regimes, cf. Barnett (1998) . The rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'thist regimes provides another illustration, cf. Kienle (1990) . This article largely moves beyond the regime-security-based approaches 3 as well as the sectarian accounts predominant in explanations of Saudi foreign policy to argue that the kingdom not only feels that its physical security is threatened but is also experiencing anxiety due to the similarity between its identity and that of other Islamic models. This is not to say that material power or internal threats to regime survival are insignificant. Rather, my study focuses on those rare moments in history where states' existential security is at risk.
Therefore, I consider critical situations, such as wars and revolutions, as a scope condition for my argument. Looking at identity narratives at these particular moments provides an useful lens alongside other material explanations. Based on an ontological security interpretation, this article attempts to explain how the Islamic revolution in Iran and the rise of the MB in Egypt developed into a risk for the Saudi regime's identity. By comparing the Saudi foreign policy discourse towards Iran in 1979 with that towards the MB in 2012, I argue that in both cases the self-identity of the kingdom was threatened as its source of distinctiveness was eroded. Consequently, the kingdom responded with the two mechanisms noted above in order to restore its identity security: reinventing its regime identity to highlight its distinctiveness vis-à-vis the 'other', and demonising the other. In the case of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia streamlined its own identity from that of a champion of the pan-Islamist discourse to being the leader of the Sunni world. In the case of the MB, the kingdom further reduced its identity to portray itself as upholding a Salafi Wahhabi narrative, an offshoot of the Sunni tradition.
To explicate this argument, the article proceeds as follows: First, I examine the concept of ontological security and develop a theoretical framework to explain how similarity can generate identity risks. Second, I examine the case of the Iranian revolution and the threat it posed to the Saudi regime, and how the regime reduced its identity and reacted with a Sunni-versus-Shiite discourse. Third, I discuss the Saudi reaction to the rise of the MB in Egypt and how the kingdom narrowed its identity to Salafi Wahhabism to face this challenge.
Ontological (In)security: A Theoretical Framework
The emphasis on cultural and ideational factors as determinants of conflict and cooperation among states has emerged as a major trend in IR theory since the end of the Cold War. Huntington's (1993 Huntington's ( , 1996 ' (1996:28) . The explosion of ethnic conflicts following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia further fuelled this hypothesis. Some scholars not only drew correlations between identity difference and enmity but also considered difference to be a major driver of conflict. Horowitz (1995) contended that group differences, highlighted by the lack of common identity denominators, are a factor in ethnic conflicts. In the same vein, Saideman (2001) suggested that states get involved in ethnic conflict based on identity affinities; they intervene to support the side of the conflict with which their constituents share an ethnicity or ethnicities. Also, social constructivists in IR asserted that a sense of shared identity eliminates the perception of threat, which is in turn likely to increase the probability of interstate cooperation (Wendt 1999; Hopf 2002; Rousseau and Rocio 2007) .
Despite the prevalence of the above literature, a few scholars opposed this trend, claiming that shared ties can be the most decisive in generating conflict and enmity. Axelrod (1997) suggested that convergence among individuals or groups can lead to division and divergence. The factors that create common identities -such as pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, or a European identity -can lead to an increased perception of difference. Based on a quantitative analysis, Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) also found that conflict is more likely among culturally similar states than among culturally dissimilar ones. 4 Although these few attempts cast doubt on identity similarity as a source of cooperation only, our knowledge of why and how identity similarity can be a source of conflict among states is still very limited.
This section thus develops a theoretical framework based on ontological security to address this gap.
Why does similarity threaten actors? Why do states need to assert a distinctive selfidentity? The answer, I argue, lies in the intricate ontological-security need of states to have a distinctive and consistent sense of self and to have that sense affirmed by others. Some IR scholars have aimed to transfer the concept of 'ontological security', coined by the psychiatrist R.D. Laing and only recently introduced to IR theory, from the individual to the state level. 5 For Laing, an ontologically secure individual is one with a firm 'sense of integral selfhood and personal identity'. The concept was further developed in Giddens' structuration theory (1984, 1991) . He defined ontological security as 'the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action ' (1991:92) . Such a sense of self is reflected in agents' behaviour. As Mitzen argues, 'ontological security is security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice ' (2006:344) . In other words, agents choose a course of action that conforms to their self-identity.
Accordingly, and in contrast to realist accounts, where security and survival are achieved through the accumulation of military capabilities, actors also engage in ontological securityseeking behaviour, which provides them with 'a sense of continuity and order in events', to affirm their self-identity (Giddens 1991:243) . Hence, ontological security involves the ability to 'experience oneself as a whole […] in order to realize a sense of agency' (Mitzen 2006:342) .
In other words, individuals need to feel secure in who they are, as they see themselves and as they want to be seen by others. As Giddens claims, 'to be ontologically secure is to possess
[…] answers to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses' (Giddens 1991:47) . This suggests that 'insecurity' means that individuals are confused about who they are and uncomfortable with their identity in social interactions with others (Steele 2005:525 However, other scholars argue that a state's sense of self is based on social interaction with others. As Mitzen argues, the state's identity is 'constituted and sustained by social relationships rather than being intrinsic ' (2006:354) . In this regard, the sense of self is only reinforced and distinguished through sustainable interactions with others. According to Kinvall, 'internalized self-notions can never be separated from self/other representations and are always responsive to new inter-personal relationships ' (2004:749) .
Barnett defines identity as 'the understanding of oneself in relationship to others' (1999:5). As identity refers to 'the image of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) held and projected by an actor' (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996:95) , the sense of self only acquires meaning through the actor's differentiation and uniqueness from the other. In other words, identity is viewed as a line of distinctiveness which 'can only be established by difference, by drawing a line between something and something else' (Nabers 2009:195) . Therefore, I build on the sociological approach that sees ontological security as based on a consistent narrative of the self, which evolves through interaction with others. If self-identity is affirmed at the self-versus-other nexus, then ontological security is strongly linked to the idea of the distinctiveness of the self.
The distinctiveness of an actor's identity is reflected in that actor's behaviour and action, which consolidate his or her understanding of the self. Acquiring ontological security entails reproducing this self-versus-other distinctiveness and routinizing it. Such distinctiveness, though connected to the self-other relationship, becomes integral to the actor's self-identity and the maintenance of a consistent narrative, which contributes to the actor's ontological security. As Mitzen suggested, 'inter-societal routines help maintain identity coherence for each group, which in turn provides individuals with a measure of ontological security' (2006:352) . In other words, states' ability to uphold a continuous distinctive identity vis-à-vis others influences the stability of state identity at the domestic level.
As continuity and order in routinized self-versus-other relationships are the main source of ontological security, 'critical situations' that alter these routines can pose risks to the sense of self and thus to identity. Giddens defined 'critical situations' as 'circumstances of a radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines ' (1984:61) . Because I have defined ontological security as the distinctive sense of self versus other, a 'critical situation' can be an external event leading to an altered representation of the other, which ultimately constitutes a source of instability and insecurity for the self. These events can include revolutions, wars, and regime changes. Such critical situations constitute the scope condition for this theoretical framework. As I discuss in more detail in the following section, the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) constituted a critical situation for the Saudis, as they perceived their distinctiveness vis-à-vis the other to be altered. In other words, if the routinized relationship between the self and other is disturbed, the agent's sense of self is endangered. The change in circumstances threatens the individual's sense of identity by altering the social coordinates by which agents recognize their own identity and continuity. These unpredictable situations constitute an identity threat, as 'agents perceive that something can be done to eliminate them' (Steele 2008:12) .
As the very basis of identity construction is differentiation and uniqueness from others, any disturbance in the self-versus-other distinction leads to agents' uncertainty about their own identity. Therefore, if the discursive constructions of the 'self' and the 'other' become increasingly similar, agents are ontologically insecure; they perceive the very basis of their selfidentity to have been eliminated. From this perspective, and in contrast to the conventional wisdom that similar identities lead to convergence and cooperation, cultural and identity similarities can lead to differentiation and conflict. Based on social identity theory, Brewer (1991) also postulated that the need for distinctiveness is met through comparisons. Consequently, similarity constitutes a threat to one's need for differentiation or distinctiveness. As
Currie notes, 'one's individuality is more threatened by similarity rather than difference ' (2004:86) . Therefore, similarity is a source of disturbance because the old and secure meaning of self and the associated sense of agency become irrelevant.
But what does 'identity similarity' mean? And is similarity always threatening? Absolute similarity, that is, sameness, is implausible. Therefore, by similarity I mean that actors share
common beliefs about what constitutes their identity. It is worth noting that not all sorts of similarity must be threatening. Social identity scholars (Snyder and Fromkin 1980; Brewer 1991) postulate that low levels of similarity can foster cooperation, whereas high levels of similarity can lead to the opposite. In this regard, actors are motivated to find an optimal balance between assimilation with and differentiation from others. Similarity, I argue here, becomes threatening if it extends to that particular line of distinctiveness without which the actor's raison d'être is meaningless. Henceforth, this lack of distinctiveness will trigger anxiety, which Giddens distinguishes from fear. Whereas fear is 'a response to a specific threat and therefore has a definite objective', anxiety is 'a generalized state of emotions' (Giddens 1991:43) . In other words, fear is a reaction to an objective material threat to the agent's survival. Anxiety, however, is a sense of insecurity that emerges when the agent's self-identity is challenged. From this perspective, anxiety causes a state of ontological insecurity that is not based on a specific objectified threat, as it attacks the 'core of the self once a basic security system is set up' (Giddens 1991:44) .
When their sense of self-identity is threatened through this similarity, actors will counter their anxiety with a dynamic adaptive reaction. To enhance their ontological security, actors are continuously monitoring their own behaviour, which reflects their ideas about their self-identity. Therefore, when critical situations alter the established self-other distinction, agents feel uncomfortable with who they are and their routines are unable to accommodate the new circumstances. Consequently, agents change their behaviour to conform to their new sense of self.
As these new circumstances create similarity, agents adopt an imperative reactionary behaviour to restore clear waters between them and the other, what Freud (1922) referred to as 'the narcissism of small differences'. Two main adaptive strategies can be discerned. Firstly, actors tend to frame the other in a demonizing way to legitimize their own identity. As illustrated in the following sections, Saudi Arabia has tended to frame the Islamic revolution in
Iran and the MB in Egypt as unfaithful and deviating from the true path of Islam. Secondly, actors are likely to bolster the old self-other distinction and seek to generate a new and secure identity. Actors reinvent relationships with others by fostering new differences and distinctions in the discourse of their identity (Bloom 1990:39-40 argue, offers an extremely useful opportunity to assess the validity of the above theoretical framework. These case studies illustrate the preliminary validity of the main argument: identity similarity can be a source of anxiety. In addition, they shed light on the relevance of the theoretical proposition and probe its plausibility for theory building. 6
6 Plausibility probe cases are 'attempts to determine whether potential validity may reasonably be considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing' (Eckstein 2000:140-141 territorial nationalism comes second (Thompson 2014:233) .
Since Saudi Arabia has two of the three holy cities of Islam within its borders -Mecca and Medina -Islam served as a source of its distinctiveness from other states in the region.
For decades, the kingdom relied on Islam to provide it with a unique identity in the region, separate from the secular pan-Arab wave that swept the region during the 1950s and 1960s
under the charismatic leadership of Egyptian president Nasser (Piscatori 1983) . In an attempt 7 The nature of the Saudi society -composed of diverse clans, tribes, and Bedouins -did not allow the emergence of a state around a collective national identity. The Arabian Peninsula was rarely unified until the forces of the Saud family succeeded in unifying the country in the early twentieth century (Kostiner 1990 ). 
Figure 2: The Saudi Identity-Reframing Process
Source: Author's own compilation.
13 Umma is used to refer to all Muslims as one community bound by religion.
14 Pan-Arabism refers to the political project of unifying all Arabs under a single state.
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The Islamic revolution, 1979 Egypt, 2012 MB in power in Egypt, 2012 Salafi Wahhabism was beholden to Iranian influence (Goldberg 1986:230) . There is no compelling evidence that Iran was involved in Saudi internal affairs. Nevertheless, a small number of Shiite clerics in Saudi Arabia were inspired by Khomeini's speeches, especially his aim to export the Islamic revolution (Ibrahim 2006) . This domestic challenge put further pressure upon the regime, as it exposed and magnified the lapses in its identity narrative.
MB in power in
These circumstances drove the Saudi rulers to reinvent their state's identity, which they needed to separate from the generic pan-Islamic rhetoric in order to re-establish a sense of Bāz, 17 more control over social and religious life (Steinberg 2005:28-29) . This was manifested in the strengthening of the religious strands in the educational system, which resulted in the state becoming closely associated not only with Islamic symbols but also with a Sunni approach that rejected Shiite symbols (Niblock 2006:55) . Moreover, the kingdom's rulers aimed to consolidate the kingdom's image as the eminent leader of the Muslim world by using the title of 'the custodian of the two holy sites' -Mecca and Medina.
In addition to creating this new distinction, the kingdom counter-framed the Islamic Republic to demonize the latter's claims. The Saudi clerical establishment produced an over-flow of anti-Shiite publications to blunt the pan-Islamic appeal of the Islamic revolution. 18 Sectarian language became more explicit. From the perspective of the Sunni ulamas, the Shiite propensity for saint worship, shrine and grave cults, and veneration of imams were abhorrent acts of polytheism (shirk). Indeed, Sunni scholars viewed Shiites as 'the incarnation of infidelity, and [...] polytheists', making it the duty of believers 'to manifest enmity to the polytheists [who] were perceived as unbelievers (kufar), and were therefore liable to the severest sanctions, including that of holy war (jihad)' (Goldberg 1986:232) . In short, this Saudi counter-framing of Shi'ism placed the Iranian regime outside of the Muslim community, describing them as defectors (rafidda).
Based on this identity consolidation, the representation of the 'Saudi-Sunni self' was contrasted with the 'Iranian-Shiite other' in Saudi foreign policy. The discourse of exclusion, based on religious otherness and framed by a religious narrative, highlighted Saudi Arabia's religious uniqueness, which was necessary to forge a distinct regime-identity narrative. In other words, sectarianism was simply a strategy for re-establishing the kingdom's distinctiveness and, thus, its ontological security. el in the region (Al-Rasheed 2013) . In other words, the very existence of the Saudi state was at stake as its distinctiveness vis-à-vis the other was being eroded. Since ontological security is the security of being, actors can feel uncomfortable if their relations with others are disrupted. With the rise of the MB, the uniqueness of the Saudi identity as the leader of Sunni world was disrupted. In other words, the kingdom found itself in a new, critical situation that generated insecurity.
The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood: Increasing Similarity and Increasing Insecurity
The rise of the MB not only eroded the distinctiveness of the kingdom's identity at the regional level, but it also became a potential threat at the domestic level as it inspired contentious voices within the kingdom. It led to discussions that questioned Saudi religious theory -the foundation of the kingdom's identity. Dissenters questioned the contradictions within this theory, especially regarding the political aspects, such as individual constitutional rights. 23 These debates were initiated most explicitly by the leaders of the al-Sahwa alIslamiyya movement (the Islamic Awakening), 24 a group that had played a crucial role in legitimizing the policies of the Al Saud, especially those against al-Qaeda, in the first decade of the century. It is worth nothing that these critics did not question the legitimacy of Al Saud. 25 In contrast, they appealed to the ability of the ruling family, and only the ruling family, to initiate reforms. In other words, these discussions did not endanger the physical security of the regime, but rather its existential ontological security.
Given these circumstances, the kingdom needed to reframe its identity. Whereas the kingdom had reinvented its identity vis-à-vis the Islamic revolution in Iran by narrowing its Islamic identity to a purely Sunni version, re-establishing identity security in 2012 was more challenging. While forging this new distinction by narrowing its own identity narrative, the kingdom went on discrediting the MB, or the new 'other'. It used several mechanisms to do so. In a word, in order to restore its identity security, the kingdom aimed to forge a new, distinctive identity narrative, not only as the sole leader of Sunni Islam in the region, but also as the upholder of a strict Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. It also portrayed the MB as unfaithful, treacherous, and radical. In this way, the Saudi royal elite was able to maintain a seemingly coherent and distinct identity, and was thus able to restore its identity security.
26 Since Egyptian president Nasser's rule in the 1950s and 1960s, the Saudi royal family had offered support and assistance to the members of the MB. This assistance took the form of political asylum for members of the group fleeing the crackdown of the Egyptian regime. It also included funding for the creation of Islamic charities that served not only the Wahhabi religious doctrine but also the MB (Mourad 2013).
Conclusion
Similarities in identity can both unite and divide. In this article, I have developed a theoretical framework to explain how such similarities can cause cleavages and be a source of anxiety. In the case of Saudi foreign policy, I have found that similarity became particularly threatening as the distinctiveness of the Saudi identity was challenged. The distinctiveness of the kingdom was based on two exclusive identity narratives, which portrayed Saudi Arabia, first, as the sole and legitimate leader of Islam, until 1979, and then, subsequently, of Sunni Islam, until 2012 . These narratives provide intriguing insights into foreign policy conduct in critical situations, when states' existential security is at stake.
Ontological security approaches provide a novel theoretical entry point for the study of Ultimately, this argument makes important contributions to IR theory. While there is some recognition that identity similarity drives cooperation, this examination of the Saudi case has probed the plausibility of identity similarity as a source of conflict, a proposition which invites theory building and testing to confirm such a hypothesis. The discussion has also contributed to our understanding of how similarity can be threatening, and how identity is framed and reframed. In its quest for distinctiveness, the kingdom has constantly highlighted its differences vis-à-vis the other, reducing its identity narrative from pan-Islamism to Sunni Islam and then to Salafi Wahhabism as a result. This suggests that future research should examine how differences are framed, and how states choose among various sources of distinctiveness. As Bateson has said, 'the number of potential differences [...] is infinite but very few become effective differences [...] that make a difference ' (1979:98) .
